outreach.io
The three core checks pass. What is missing is the transport and trust layer around them.
4 of 8 checks pass · 7 tools visible in DNS · nothing urgent
1 · Authentication and transport
SPF
PassValid, hard failAnything not on the list is rejected. The strongest setting.
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:fdspfus.freshemail.io a:zgateway.zuora.com include:mktomail.com ip4:52.41.178.8 -all
DKIM
Pass6 keys foundSelectors google, selector1, selector2, s1, s2, smtp publish a public key. 4 of them point at a vendor by CNAME.
google._domainkey, selector1._domainkey, selector2._domainkey, s1._domainkey, s2._domainkey, smtp._domainkey
DMARC
PassEnforced (p=reject)Failing mail is rejected. This is the finish line.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:cofvk6yr@ag.dmarcian.com,mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
MX
Pass1 hostOne host, but it is a provider endpoint that is redundant behind the name.
10 smtp.google.com
MTA-STS
ReviewNot publishedSending servers cannot tell that this domain requires TLS, so inbound mail can be downgraded to plain text by anyone on the path.
TLS-RPT
OptionalNot publishedNobody is told when TLS to this domain fails. Cheap to add once MTA-STS is in place.
BIMI
OptionalNot publishedDMARC is enforced, so this domain qualifies. Yahoo and Fastmail show the logo from the record alone; Gmail and Apple Mail also need a paid VMC or CMC certificate.
DNSSEC
OptionalNot signedOptional. Signing the zone protects every record in this report from tampering.
2 · Tools visible in DNS
| Layer | Tool | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Mailbox | Google Workspace | MX smtp.google.com |
| Mailbox | Microsoft 365 | DKIM selector1._domainkey → selector1-outreach-io._domainkey.outreachsales.onmicrosoft.com |
| Marketing | Marketo | SPF include:mktomail.com |
| Transactional | SendGrid | DKIM s1._domainkey → s1.domainkey.u15648796.wl047.sendgrid.net |
| Support | Zendesk | SPF include:mail.zendesk.com |
| Support | Freshdesk | SPF include:fdspfus.freshemail.io |
| DMARC reporting | dmarcian | DMARC rua=mailto:…@ag.dmarcian.com |
Only tools that leave a DNS trace appear. A shared DKIM selector is attributed only when its CNAME target names the vendor.
3 · Sender requirements (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft)
| Requirement | Applies to | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authenticate with SPF or DKIM | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Verified | At least one method is in place. |
| Bulk senders: both SPF and DKIM | GoogleYahoo | Verified | Both are present. |
| Publish a DMARC record (p=none is enough) | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Verified | Policy is p=reject. |
| From: domain aligns with SPF or DKIM | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Not checkable here | Needs a real message. The Send-a-Test report will check this. |
| Valid forward and reverse DNS for sending IPs | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Depends on the sending server, not the domain. |
| Encrypt in transit (TLS) | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Outbound TLS depends on your sending tool; MTA-STS would cover inbound. |
| One-click unsubscribe (RFC 8058) for marketing mail | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | A message header, not a DNS record. Microsoft recommends it rather than requiring it. |
| Spam complaint rate under 0.1% (0.3% is the hard limit) | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Read it in Google Postmaster Tools and Yahoo Sender Hub. Google’s target is 0.1%; 0.3% is where enforcement starts. |
4 · What to fix, in order
-
P3
Publish MTA-STS (record and policy file)
Tells sending servers to require TLS to your MX hosts, which prevents downgrade attacks. The TXT record alone does nothing: the policy file must be served over HTTPS at mta-sts.outreach.io. Start in testing mode, watch TLS-RPT, then switch to enforce.
Publish at_mta-sts.outreach.io and https://mta-sts.outreach.io/.well-known/mta-sts.txtTXT v=STSv1; id=2026100401 mta-sts.txt: version: STSv1 mode: testing mx: smtp.google.com max_age: 86400
-
P3
Publish TLS-RPT
You get a report when TLS delivery to your domain fails; this is what notices a downgrade that MTA-STS is meant to prevent. The address must exist.
Publish at_smtp._tls.outreach.iov=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-rpt@outreach.io
-
P3
Add a BIMI logo record (optional)
DMARC already qualifies. The logo must be SVG Tiny PS, square, served over HTTPS. Yahoo and Fastmail show it from the record alone; Gmail and Apple Mail also need a paid VMC or CMC certificate, and a VMC needs a registered trademark. Skip this unless the certificate is worth it to you.
Publish atdefault._bimi.outreach.iov=BIMI1; l=https://outreach.io/.well-known/bimi.svg;
-
P3
Sign the zone with DNSSEC
Protects every record in this report from being swapped in transit. Two steps: enable signing at your DNS host (one switch at Cloudflare and most others), then add the DS record it gives you at your registrar.
Publish atoutreach.io
Appendix · Raw DNS answers
| Name | Type | Answer |
|---|---|---|
| outreach.io | MX | 10 smtp.google.com |
| outreach.io | A | 54.240.162.93 54.240.162.6 54.240.162.128 54.240.162.26 |
| outreach.io | TXT | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:fdspfus.freshemail.io a:zgateway.zuora.com include:mktomail.com ip4:52.41.178.8 -all (+ 17 other TXT records: site-verification tokens and the like, omitted) |
| _dmarc.outreach.io | TXT | v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:cofvk6yr@ag.dmarcian.com,mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com |
| <selector>._domainkey.outreach.io | TXT | google → key published selector1 → CNAME selector1-outreach-io._domainkey.outreachsales.onmicrosoft.com selector2 → CNAME selector2-outreach-io._domainkey.outreachsales.onmicrosoft.com s1 → CNAME s1.domainkey.u15648796.wl047.sendgrid.net s2 → CNAME s2.domainkey.u15648796.wl047.sendgrid.net smtp → key published |
| _mta-sts.outreach.io | TXT | no record |
| _smtp._tls.outreach.io | TXT | no record |
| default._bimi.outreach.io | TXT | no record |