huggingface.co email setup: SPF, DKIM, DMARC & tools

You are viewing a shared snapshot read on . It may differ from what DNS says now.

Domain

huggingface.co

DMARC is monitoring only, so spoofed mail still reaches inboxes. The reports are the path forward.

4 of 8 checks pass · 4 tools visible in DNS · nothing urgent

Grade D

SPFValid, soft fail20/20

DKIM3 keys found15/15

DMARCMonitoring only (p=none)12/30

MX5 hosts10/10

MTA-STSNot published0/10

TLS-RPTNot published0/5

BIMINot published0/5

DNSSECValidated5/5

1 · Authentication and transport

SPF

PassValid, soft fail

Anything not on the list is accepted but marked. Google recommends ~all; with DMARC enforced it is as strong as -all.

v=spf1 include:spf.mailjet.com include:_spf.google.com include:amazonses.com include:mail.zendesk.com ~all

DKIM

Pass3 keys found

Selectors google, k2, k3 publish a public key. 2 of them point at a vendor by CNAME.

google._domainkey, k2._domainkey, k3._domainkey

DMARC

ReviewMonitoring only (p=none)

Failing mail is delivered as normal. You get reports, receivers get no instruction.

v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none;rua=mailto:dmarc@huggingface.co; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=s

Policy is p=none (monitoring only). Spoofed mail can still reach inboxes.

MX

Pass5 hosts

More than one receiving server, so a single outage does not bounce mail.

10 aspmx.l.google.com
20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
30 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
40 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
50 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com

MTA-STS

ReviewNot published

Sending servers cannot tell that this domain requires TLS, so inbound mail can be downgraded to plain text by anyone on the path.

TLS-RPT

OptionalNot published

Nobody is told when TLS to this domain fails. Cheap to add once MTA-STS is in place.

BIMI

OptionalNot published

Optional, and it requires DMARC at quarantine or reject first.

DNSSEC

PassValidated

The resolver validated the zone, so the records above cannot be silently swapped in transit.

2 · Tools visible in DNS

Layer	Tool	Evidence
Mailbox	Google Workspace	MX aspmx.l.google.com
Transactional	Amazon SES	SPF include:amazonses.com
Transactional	Mailjet	SPF include:spf.mailjet.com
Support	Zendesk	SPF include:mail.zendesk.com

Only tools that leave a DNS trace appear. A shared DKIM selector is attributed only when its CNAME target names the vendor.

3 · Sender requirements (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft)

Requirement	Applies to	Status	Note
Authenticate with SPF or DKIM	GoogleYahooMicrosoft	Verified	At least one method is in place.
Bulk senders: both SPF and DKIM	GoogleYahoo	Verified	Both are present.
Publish a DMARC record (p=none is enough)	GoogleYahooMicrosoft	Verified	Policy is p=none.
From: domain aligns with SPF or DKIM	GoogleYahooMicrosoft	Not checkable here	Needs a real message. The Send-a-Test report will check this.
Valid forward and reverse DNS for sending IPs	GoogleYahoo	Not checkable here	Depends on the sending server, not the domain.
Encrypt in transit (TLS)	GoogleYahoo	Not checkable here	Outbound TLS depends on your sending tool; MTA-STS would cover inbound.
One-click unsubscribe (RFC 8058) for marketing mail	GoogleYahoo	Not checkable here	A message header, not a DNS record. Microsoft recommends it rather than requiring it.
Spam complaint rate under 0.1% (0.3% is the hard limit)	GoogleYahoo	Not checkable here	Read it in Google Postmaster Tools and Yahoo Sender Hub. Google’s target is 0.1%; 0.3% is where enforcement starts.

4 · What to fix, in order

P2
Move DMARC from monitoring to enforcement

p=none protects nothing. Once your legitimate senders pass, step up gradually.

Publish at_dmarc.huggingface.co
```
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=25; rua=mailto:dmarc@huggingface.co; fo=1
```
P3
Publish MTA-STS (record and policy file)

Tells sending servers to require TLS to your MX hosts, which prevents downgrade attacks. The TXT record alone does nothing: the policy file must be served over HTTPS at mta-sts.huggingface.co. Start in testing mode, watch TLS-RPT, then switch to enforce.

Publish at_mta-sts.huggingface.co and https://mta-sts.huggingface.co/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
```
TXT  v=STSv1; id=2026100401

mta-sts.txt:
version: STSv1
mode: testing
mx: aspmx.l.google.com
mx: alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
mx: alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
mx: alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
mx: alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
max_age: 86400
```
P3
Publish TLS-RPT

You get a report when TLS delivery to your domain fails; this is what notices a downgrade that MTA-STS is meant to prevent. The address must exist.

Publish at_smtp._tls.huggingface.co
```
v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-rpt@huggingface.co
```

Appendix · Raw DNS answers

Name	Type	Answer
huggingface.co	MX	10 aspmx.l.google.com 20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 30 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 40 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 50 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
huggingface.co	A	99.86.147.94 99.86.147.108 99.86.147.32 99.86.147.65
huggingface.co	TXT	v=spf1 include:spf.mailjet.com include:_spf.google.com include:amazonses.com include:mail.zendesk.com ~all (+ 20 other TXT records: site-verification tokens and the like, omitted)
_dmarc.huggingface.co	TXT	v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none;rua=mailto:dmarc@huggingface.co; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=s
<selector>._domainkey.huggingface.co	TXT	google → key published k2 → CNAME dkim2.mcsv.net k3 → CNAME dkim3.mcsv.net
_mta-sts.huggingface.co	TXT	no record
_smtp._tls.huggingface.co	TXT	no record
default._bimi.huggingface.co	TXT	no record

About this report

The Email Stack reads public DNS for well-known domains and publishes the result as a report, the same one anyone can generate for any domain at /report. It is a point-in-time read: records change, and a domain that scores D today may score differently next month. The "Re-run live" button reads DNS again in your browser.

Scores weigh SPF 20, DKIM 15, DMARC 30, MX 10, MTA-STS 10, TLS-RPT 5, BIMI 5 and DNSSEC 5. Tools are named only when a DNS record names the vendor; a shared DKIM selector counts only when its CNAME target does. Message-level requirements such as alignment and one-click unsubscribe cannot be read from DNS and are marked as such, never guessed. Method: how we detect tools.

Own this domain and see something wrong? DNS is the source; fix the record and the next read will show it. Questions to hello@theemailstack.com.

huggingface.coemail setup