figma.com
The three core checks pass. What is missing is the transport and trust layer around them.
5 of 8 checks pass · 3 tools visible in DNS · nothing urgent
1 · Authentication and transport
SPF
PassValid, hard failAnything not on the list is rejected. The strongest setting.
v=spf1 a include:_spf.google.com ip4:149.72.216.165 ip4:167.89.79.69 ip4:167.89.87.53 ip4:168.245.25.177 ip4:167.89.97.206 include:mail.zendesk.com include:mg-spf.greenhouse.io -all
DKIM
Pass6 keys foundSelectors google, k1, k2, k3, s1, s2 publish a public key. 4 of them point at a vendor by CNAME.
google._domainkey, k1._domainkey, k2._domainkey, k3._domainkey, s1._domainkey, s2._domainkey
DMARC
PassPartial (p=quarantine)Failing mail goes to spam. One step from full enforcement.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;
- No "rua=" address — you will not receive aggregate reports.
- No rua= address, so nobody receives the aggregate reports.
MX
Pass5 hostsMore than one receiving server, so a single outage does not bounce mail.
10 aspmx.l.google.com 20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 30 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 40 aspmx2.googlemail.com 50 aspmx3.googlemail.com
MTA-STS
ReviewNot publishedSending servers cannot tell that this domain requires TLS, so inbound mail can be downgraded to plain text by anyone on the path.
TLS-RPT
OptionalNot publishedNobody is told when TLS to this domain fails. Cheap to add once MTA-STS is in place.
BIMI
PassPublishedLogo record found and DMARC qualifies. Yahoo shows it from the record; Gmail and Apple Mail also need a VMC or CMC certificate (the a= tag).
v=BIMI1;l=https://figma-static-assets.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/figma_314290589.svg;a=
DNSSEC
OptionalNot signedOptional. Signing the zone protects every record in this report from tampering.
2 · Tools visible in DNS
| Layer | Tool | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Mailbox | Google Workspace | MX aspmx.l.google.com |
| Transactional | SendGrid | DKIM s1._domainkey → s1.domainkey.u30095663.wl164.sendgrid.net |
| Support | Zendesk | SPF include:mail.zendesk.com |
Only tools that leave a DNS trace appear. A shared DKIM selector is attributed only when its CNAME target names the vendor.
3 · Sender requirements (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft)
| Requirement | Applies to | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authenticate with SPF or DKIM | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Verified | At least one method is in place. |
| Bulk senders: both SPF and DKIM | GoogleYahoo | Verified | Both are present. |
| Publish a DMARC record (p=none is enough) | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Verified | Policy is p=quarantine. |
| From: domain aligns with SPF or DKIM | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Not checkable here | Needs a real message. The Send-a-Test report will check this. |
| Valid forward and reverse DNS for sending IPs | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Depends on the sending server, not the domain. |
| Encrypt in transit (TLS) | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Outbound TLS depends on your sending tool; MTA-STS would cover inbound. |
| One-click unsubscribe (RFC 8058) for marketing mail | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | A message header, not a DNS record. Microsoft recommends it rather than requiring it. |
| Spam complaint rate under 0.1% (0.3% is the hard limit) | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Read it in Google Postmaster Tools and Yahoo Sender Hub. Google’s target is 0.1%; 0.3% is where enforcement starts. |
4 · What to fix, in order
-
P2
Finish DMARC at p=reject
Quarantine still delivers spoofed mail, just into spam.
Publish at_dmarc.figma.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@figma.com; fo=1
-
P2
Add a rua= address to DMARC
Without reports you cannot see who is failing, or who is spoofing you.
Publish at_dmarc.figma.comv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@figma.com
-
P3
Publish MTA-STS (record and policy file)
Tells sending servers to require TLS to your MX hosts, which prevents downgrade attacks. The TXT record alone does nothing: the policy file must be served over HTTPS at mta-sts.figma.com. Start in testing mode, watch TLS-RPT, then switch to enforce.
Publish at_mta-sts.figma.com and https://mta-sts.figma.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtTXT v=STSv1; id=2026100401 mta-sts.txt: version: STSv1 mode: testing mx: aspmx.l.google.com mx: alt1.aspmx.l.google.com mx: alt2.aspmx.l.google.com mx: aspmx2.googlemail.com mx: aspmx3.googlemail.com max_age: 86400
-
P3
Publish TLS-RPT
You get a report when TLS delivery to your domain fails; this is what notices a downgrade that MTA-STS is meant to prevent. The address must exist.
Publish at_smtp._tls.figma.comv=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-rpt@figma.com
-
P3
Sign the zone with DNSSEC
Protects every record in this report from being swapped in transit. Two steps: enable signing at your DNS host (one switch at Cloudflare and most others), then add the DS record it gives you at your registrar.
Publish atfigma.com
Appendix · Raw DNS answers
| Name | Type | Answer |
|---|---|---|
| figma.com | MX | 10 aspmx.l.google.com 20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 30 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 40 aspmx2.googlemail.com 50 aspmx3.googlemail.com |
| figma.com | A | 18.67.161.112 18.67.161.8 18.67.161.63 18.67.161.129 |
| figma.com | TXT | v=spf1 a include:_spf.google.com ip4:149.72.216.165 ip4:167.89.79.69 ip4:167.89.87.53 ip4:168.245.25.177 ip4:167.89.97.206 include:mail.zendesk.com include:mg-spf.greenhouse.io -all (+ 41 other TXT records: site-verification tokens and the like, omitted) |
| _dmarc.figma.com | TXT | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; |
| <selector>._domainkey.figma.com | TXT | google → key published k1 → key published k2 → CNAME dkim2.mcsv.net k3 → CNAME dkim3.mcsv.net s1 → CNAME s1.domainkey.u30095663.wl164.sendgrid.net s2 → CNAME s2.domainkey.u30095663.wl164.sendgrid.net |
| _mta-sts.figma.com | TXT | v=spf1 -all |
| _smtp._tls.figma.com | TXT | v=spf1 -all |
| default._bimi.figma.com | TXT | v=BIMI1;l=https://figma-static-assets.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/figma_314290589.svg;a= |