auth0.com
The three core checks pass. What is missing is the transport and trust layer around them.
4 of 8 checks pass · 6 tools visible in DNS · nothing urgent
1 · Authentication and transport
SPF
PassValid, hard failAnything not on the list is rejected. The strongest setting.
v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:amazonses.com include:_spf.intacct.com include:mktomail.com ip4:74.125.0.0/16 ip4:209.85.128.0/17 ip6:2001:4860:4864::/56 ip6:2404:6800:4864::/56 ip6:2607:f8b0:4864::/56 ip6:2800:3f0:4864::/56 ip6:2a00:1450:4864::/56 ip6:2c0f:fb50:4864::/56 exists:%{i}._spf.mta.salesforce.com ip4:205.220.176.21 ip4:205.220.164.21 ip4:168.245.48.84 ip4:168.245.73.252 ip4:50.31.57.204 ip4:198.21.5.209 ip4:167.89.21.169 ip4:167.89.14.31 ip4:167.89.126.180 ip4:167.89.110.192 ip4:208.185.229.0/24 ip4:208.185.235.0/24 ip4:148.59.108.0/23 ip4:148.59.106.0/23 ip4:159.183.193.109 ip4:159.183.213.105 ip4:159.183.213.107 ip4:159.183.214.96 ip4:159.183.213.204 ip4:159.183.200.101 ip4:149.72.233.170 ip4:149.72.90.103 ip4:192.254.124.136 ip4:198.37.159.181 ip4:167.89.51.134 ip4:192.174.90.242 ip4:159.183.191.229 -all
DKIM
Pass4 keys foundSelectors google, s1, s2, mandrill publish a public key. 2 of them point at a vendor by CNAME.
google._domainkey, s1._domainkey, s2._domainkey, mandrill._domainkey
DMARC
PassPartial (p=quarantine)Failing mail goes to spam. One step from full enforcement.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@okta.com; sp=quarantine; fo=1;
MX
Pass2 hostsMore than one receiving server, so a single outage does not bounce mail.
10 mxa-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com 20 mxb-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com
MTA-STS
ReviewNot publishedSending servers cannot tell that this domain requires TLS, so inbound mail can be downgraded to plain text by anyone on the path.
TLS-RPT
OptionalNot publishedNobody is told when TLS to this domain fails. Cheap to add once MTA-STS is in place.
BIMI
OptionalNot publishedDMARC is enforced, so this domain qualifies. Yahoo and Fastmail show the logo from the record alone; Gmail and Apple Mail also need a paid VMC or CMC certificate.
DNSSEC
OptionalNot signedOptional. Signing the zone protects every record in this report from tampering.
2 · Tools visible in DNS
| Layer | Tool | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Mailbox | Google Workspace | DKIM google._domainkey |
| Gateway | Proofpoint | MX mxa-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com |
| Marketing | Mailchimp | DKIM mandrill._domainkey |
| Marketing | Marketo | SPF include:mktomail.com |
| Transactional | Amazon SES | SPF include:amazonses.com |
| Transactional | SendGrid | DKIM s1._domainkey → s1.domainkey.u2172013.wl014.sendgrid.net |
Only tools that leave a DNS trace appear. A shared DKIM selector is attributed only when its CNAME target names the vendor.
3 · Sender requirements (Google, Yahoo, Microsoft)
| Requirement | Applies to | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authenticate with SPF or DKIM | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Verified | At least one method is in place. |
| Bulk senders: both SPF and DKIM | GoogleYahoo | Verified | Both are present. |
| Publish a DMARC record (p=none is enough) | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Verified | Policy is p=quarantine. |
| From: domain aligns with SPF or DKIM | GoogleYahooMicrosoft | Not checkable here | Needs a real message. The Send-a-Test report will check this. |
| Valid forward and reverse DNS for sending IPs | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Depends on the sending server, not the domain. |
| Encrypt in transit (TLS) | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Outbound TLS depends on your sending tool; MTA-STS would cover inbound. |
| One-click unsubscribe (RFC 8058) for marketing mail | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | A message header, not a DNS record. Microsoft recommends it rather than requiring it. |
| Spam complaint rate under 0.1% (0.3% is the hard limit) | GoogleYahoo | Not checkable here | Read it in Google Postmaster Tools and Yahoo Sender Hub. Google’s target is 0.1%; 0.3% is where enforcement starts. |
4 · What to fix, in order
-
P2
Finish DMARC at p=reject
Quarantine still delivers spoofed mail, just into spam.
Publish at_dmarc.auth0.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@auth0.com; fo=1
-
P3
Publish MTA-STS (record and policy file)
Tells sending servers to require TLS to your MX hosts, which prevents downgrade attacks. The TXT record alone does nothing: the policy file must be served over HTTPS at mta-sts.auth0.com. Start in testing mode, watch TLS-RPT, then switch to enforce.
Publish at_mta-sts.auth0.com and https://mta-sts.auth0.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txtTXT v=STSv1; id=2026100401 mta-sts.txt: version: STSv1 mode: testing mx: mxa-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com mx: mxb-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com max_age: 86400
-
P3
Publish TLS-RPT
You get a report when TLS delivery to your domain fails; this is what notices a downgrade that MTA-STS is meant to prevent. The address must exist.
Publish at_smtp._tls.auth0.comv=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-rpt@auth0.com
-
P3
Add a BIMI logo record (optional)
DMARC already qualifies. The logo must be SVG Tiny PS, square, served over HTTPS. Yahoo and Fastmail show it from the record alone; Gmail and Apple Mail also need a paid VMC or CMC certificate, and a VMC needs a registered trademark. Skip this unless the certificate is worth it to you.
Publish atdefault._bimi.auth0.comv=BIMI1; l=https://auth0.com/.well-known/bimi.svg;
-
P3
Sign the zone with DNSSEC
Protects every record in this report from being swapped in transit. Two steps: enable signing at your DNS host (one switch at Cloudflare and most others), then add the DS record it gives you at your registrar.
Publish atauth0.com
Appendix · Raw DNS answers
| Name | Type | Answer |
|---|---|---|
| auth0.com | MX | 10 mxa-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com 20 mxb-00553301.gslb.pphosted.com |
| auth0.com | A | 172.64.150.238 104.18.37.18 |
| auth0.com | TXT | v=spf1 include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:amazonses.com include:_spf.intacct.com include:mktomail.com ip4:74.125.0.0/16 ip4:209.85.128.0/17 ip6:2001:4860:4864::/56 ip6:2404:6800:4864::/56 ip6:2607:f8b0:4864::/56 ip6:2800:3f0:4864::/56 ip6:2a00:1450:4864::/56 ip6:2c0f:fb50:4864::/56 exists:%{i}._spf.mta.salesforce.com ip4:205.220.176.21 ip4:205.220.164.21 ip4:168.245.48.84 ip4:168.245.73.252 ip4:50.31.57.204 ip4:198.21.5.209 ip4:167.89.21.169 ip4:167.89.14.31 ip4:167.89.126.180 ip4:167.89.110.192 ip4:208.185.229.0/24 ip4:208.185.235.0/24 ip4:148.59.108.0/23 ip4:148.59.106.0/23 ip4:159.183.193.109 ip4:159.183.213.105 ip4:159.183.213.107 ip4:159.183.214.96 ip4:159.183.213.204 ip4:159.183.200.101 ip4:149.72.233.170 ip4:149.72.90.103 ip4:192.254.124.136 ip4:198.37.159.181 ip4:167.89.51.134 ip4:192.174.90.242 ip4:159.183.191.229 -all (+ 25 other TXT records: site-verification tokens and the like, omitted) |
| _dmarc.auth0.com | TXT | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@okta.com; sp=quarantine; fo=1; |
| <selector>._domainkey.auth0.com | TXT | google → key published s1 → CNAME s1.domainkey.u2172013.wl014.sendgrid.net s2 → CNAME s2.domainkey.u2172013.wl014.sendgrid.net mandrill → key published |
| _mta-sts.auth0.com | TXT | no record |
| _smtp._tls.auth0.com | TXT | no record |
| default._bimi.auth0.com | TXT | no record |